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TO TRAP THE WHITE TIGER AND UNICORN, THE
GOVERNMENT NEEDS BETTER TRAPS: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE VIABILITY OF PREDATORY
PRICING CLAIMS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
DENNIS J. KEITHLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE VIABILITY OF a predatory pricing claim is an often de-
bated topic. Some experts in antitrust law argue that preda-
tory pricing is irrational, and unlikely to occur.1 Indeed, one
expert in the field noted that two FTC Commissioners analo-
gized predatory pricing to white tigers and unicorns in an effort
to demonstrate that many think the existence of an actual occur-
rence of predatory pricing is either rare or nonexistent.' Others
argue that it can occur and does exist, but that current methods
for determining liability for predatory pricing fail to either de-
tect it or do not permit a successful prosecution of it.3 Despite
those that claim predatory pricing is but a myth, predatory pric-
ing remains a potential threat to competition in the airline
industry.
Under the current predatory pricing laws, an airline can hide
behind its own faulty or inadequate accounting procedures, or
in a worst case scenario, deliberately hide its predatory practices
in its accounting procedures. In such a scenario, the govern-
ment faces a nearly impossible task of showing the costs of the
airline to be predatory. In addition, the government enables
airlines to engage in behavior that is, at least on the surface,
* Dennis J. Keithly, J.D., SMU Dedman School of Law. The author would like
to thank Nikki Renna for her advice and suggestions while writing this article,
Beverly Dureus, and the SMU Law faculty.
1 Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 586 (1994).
2 Id.
3 Id. (noting that the post-Chicago school of economics has set forth new theo-
ries of predatory pricing including "deep pocket" predatory pricers and "mul-
timarket recoupment" that have not yet been adopted).
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predatory. This has been done through the enactment of such
laws as the Wright Amendment and through assistance, in the
form of bailouts, to airlines that are routinely unprofitable. As a
result, competitors (specifically low-cost carriers), competition,
and ultimately consumers are harmed. There are many possible
solutions to these problems ranging from denying assistance to
failing airlines, changing the method of measuring cost in a
predatory pricing claim, relaxing the standards for measuring
cost, and changing the elements the government needs to prove
in order to successfully prosecute a predatory pricing claim.
This article begins by briefly outlining the current law in preda-
tory pricing by examining some recent cases and how they have
been applied. Next, predatory pricing in the airline industry
will be demonstrated by an example of a recent predatory pric-
ing claim involving American Airlines. To further illustrate
predatory pricing in the airline industry, the features and
problems of low-cost carriers, including how they are preyed
upon, will be briefly examined. Southwest Airlines will be used
to illustrate how an effective low-cost carrier works. Finally,
problems in measuring costs will be outlined, and some poten-
tial solutions will be proposed.
II. CURRENT STATE OF ANTI-TRUST LAW
A. OVERVIEW OF PREDATORY PRICING LAW
The preeminent case in predatory pricing law is Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation.4 This case con-
cerned predatory pricing as practiced in the cigarette industry
with regards to generic brands of cigarettes.5 The Court applied
Chicago school economics and determined that the firm of
Brown & Williamson was not liable for predatory pricing.6 The
most important aspect of this case was that it clarified the re-
quirements needed to successfully prosecute a predatory pricing
claim and resolved a conflict among the federal courts. Those
4 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 243. The "Chicago school of economics" is a collection of literature
written largely by scholars educated at the University of Chicago which holds that
many types of behavior that the Supreme Court had previously determined to be
unlawful could not possibly harm consumers, and furthermore, predatory pricing
could never be implemented profitably. RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Is Post-Chicago Eco-
nomics Ready for the Courtroom? A Response to Professor Brennan, 69 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1103, 1105-06 (2001).
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requirements, initially outlined in the Sherman Act,7 are setting
prices below actual costs coupled with a reasonable prospect of
recovering profits lost during the predatory period by increasing
prices after the competition has folded, been driven out of the
market, or acquiesced and raised prices." It is also important to
note that competition must be harmed, and that it is insufficient
for a competitor to simply suffer injury.'
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there was no defini-
tive method for determining the appropriate measure of cost.' °
In its opinion, the Court accepted average variable cost, as de-
fined by the parties, as an acceptable method, but did not adopt
it." The Supreme Court acknowledged in another case, Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 2 that the issue was still unde-
cided concerning what the appropriate measure of cost was in a
predatory pricing case. The Sixth Circuit had adopted a "stan-
dard for evaluating claims of predatory pricing" employed by
the Ninth Circuit in which the plaintiff bore the burden of
proof when the defendant's prices were set below total average
prices but above average variable price. However, when the
plaintiff set prices below average variable costs, the burden shifts
to the defendant to prove that prices were justified.' 3 The Su-
preme Court also noted in Cargill that the Ninth Circuit'" found
predatory pricing when a company reduced prices to just over
cost, finding that such a price reduction may be predatory pric-
ing subject to showing a predatory intent. 15 In their case, the
7 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).
8 Under the Robinson-Patman Act, which amended the Clayton Act, a reasona-
ble prospect is required. Under the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability of
recovering lost profits is required. Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209; see also
Baker, supra note 1, at 593-94 (explaining that a reasonable prospect is required
under the Robinson-Patman Act standard for primary-line price discrimination,
and a "dangerous probability" is required for a Sherman Act Section 2 attempted
monopolization).
9 Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 224.
lo Id. at 223 n.l.
11 Id.
12 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 n.12 (1986). Cargill
concerned an action brought by a beef packer against two larger beef packers to
keep them from merging. The Court ruled that the possible loss of profits by the
plaintiff from price competition after the merger was insufficient to show preda-
tory pricing. Id. at 117.
13 Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.
1984).
14 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1983). This case concerned manufacturers of "plug-compatible" peripherals.
15 Gargill, 479 U.S. at 117 n.12.
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Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari. 16 However, the
Ninth Circuit's decision has been effectively overruled by Brooke
and related cases. 17
B. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT PREDATORY PRICING LAW
There are several problems with the current method for de-
termining predatory pricing. First, cost is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to measure. Although there has been no definitive
method for measuring costs, the courts typically accept marginal
or variable costs. These are often difficult to distinguish from
fixed costs. Fixed costs are generally not accepted as a measure-
ment of cost in predatory pricing cases in which changes in vol-
ume, production, or capacity are an issue. What makes a cost
"fixed" is that it typically does not change when additional ca-
pacity is added or additional units are produced."i Examples of
fixed costs are typically things like management expenses, prop-
erty taxes, and depreciation.1 9 Variable costs are the opposite:
costs that change with the level of production. 20 Airline-specific
examples include things like fuel and salary expenses for the
crews handling additional flights.21 Therefore, many courts re-
ject any measure of fixed costs when the government, or an-
other plaintiff, is trying to prove a case of predatory pricing.2
2
Due to the difficulty of separating fixed costs and variable
costs, it can be difficult to isolate the cost component of a preda-
tory pricing claim. Without this component, the government or
other plaintiffs usually find it difficult, if not impossible to prove
their cases.23
Furthermore, since no fixed costs can be used in a predatory
pricing claim, defendants may try to disguise their marginal
costs as fixed costs. An example of this is airline reservations. If
only a few routes are added, or only a marginal amount of ca-
pacity is increased on a particular route, then the existing reser-
vation offices of an airline are probably sufficient to handle
reservation services for these routes. However, if the growth of
16 Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
17 See, e.g., Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8 (1986).




22 Id. at 1109.
23 See id.
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the airline is sufficient enough, eventually the airline will need
to hire additional employees and possibly open additional reser-
vation offices.24 This makes a predatory pricing claim more
complex. Whether an item such as a "reservation" is a fixed or
variable cost will be debated by both parties, and whether it is a
matter of law or fact is uncertain. Additional problems with
measuring cost will be discussed in a later section of this article.
In addition, activities such as acquiring investment capital, re-
search and development, and advertising can make cost difficult
to measure.25 The costs associated with these types of activities
are not an appropriate basis for an antitrust violation.2 6 Seeking
investment capital and activities such as research and develop-
ment are just good business. Advertising is indicative of healthy
competition as one firm attempts to draw new customers by pro-
moting a better, more exciting, or new product rather than by
cutting prices to a level below the firm's cost of production.
C. DOUBTS ABOUT PREDATORY PRICING
Many courts and scholars have expressed disbelief in the via-
bility of a predatory pricing claim. 7 Under the existing law that
surrounds the Sherman Act, a successful predatory pricing
scheme in the airline industry would typically require an airline
to reduce the price of airfare to a point that is below the actual
cost associated with providing flights on that route. 28 The "dan-
gerous probability" that the airline will recover its losses through
monopoly profits once the competition is forced out of the
route must also exist.29 As some opinions point out, predatory
pricing schemes are inherently risky and irrational due to the
inherent risk in reducing prices, and the accompanying uncer-
24 Southwest is closing some reservation offices to save costs, which would indi-
cate that reservations are a variable cost. Trebor Banstetter, Low-cost Airlines Post
Year of Profits, FORT-WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Jan. 23, 2004, available at 2004 WL
56485672. In AMR Corp., reservations would likely be considered a management
expense, which is another example of a fixed cost. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1115.
25 Baker, supra note 1, at 588.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 226 (1993) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 589 (1986) ("predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more
rarely successful.")).
28 Id. at 223-24.
29 Id.
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tainty of being able to recover lost profits by increasing prices
once a competitor has been forced, if at all, from the market.30
Several factors make future profits uncertain. Some of these
factors include that the monopoly price obtained after the com-
petitor is forced from the market must be high enough to
recoup lost profits when prices were set low, that the product
may become obsolete during the predatory pricing phase, and
that the risk of a monopoly encourages new competition to
enter the market. 1 However, in the airline industry, the likeli-
hood of transportation via airplanes becoming obsolete is rela-
tively remote. 2 The probability of new airlines entering the
market is high, especially when there is a perceived lack of com-
petition in a market; however, it is usually against the new and
emerging low-cost carriers that one of the major airlines would
engage in predatory pricing practices. 3
For an airline, the danger in engaging in predatory pricing
lies in the ability to recover lost profits during the predatory
pricing phase. Unlike a tangible product, such as a car or ciga-
rettes, a seat on a plane for a particular flight is an extremely
perishable commodity. Once that flight has left the gate, that
seat cannot be sold in the future. While some firms producing
tangible products may be able to sell those items and recover
lost profits on those items they were unable to sell during a price
war, an airline does not have that advantage.
30 AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1114; see also Baker, supra note 1, at 586.
31 The danger arises because a successful predatory pricing phase usually takes
years to be successful, in which it is likely that a new product will be developed.
In addition, a lack of competition is usually a factor that encourages new parties
to enter a market, whereas an abundance of competition usually discourages it.
See Baker, supra note 1, at 586.
32 Although events like the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 may reduce
the willingness of the public to fly, such an event is not likely to discourage air
transportation completely, and the reduced traffic is only temporary. Southwest
Airlines has started to see an increase in some markets, such as business travel, in
the last quarter of 2003. See Banstetter, supra note 24.
33 See Dawn Gilbertson, Airline Earnings Taking Fight;, AmWest Posts Unexepected
Profit;, Southwest also in Black, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 2004, available at
2004 WL 57356733 (quoting America West's Chairman and CEO that competi-
tors' fares were designed to drive America West out of markets in which they were
in competition).
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III. AN EXAMPLE OF PREDATORY PRICING IN THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: UNITED STATES V.
AMR CORPORATION
Predatory pricing claims have surfaced in the airline industry
on several occasions. The scenario that would prompt a preda-
tory pricing inquiry would occur when an airline lowers its
prices in response to a new airline entering a market. Under
the current method for determining predatory pricing, the
court would want to distinguish between the airline's fixed and
variable costs. Once that determination has been made, the
court would compare the airline's prices to the variable costs.
Things such as reservations, management salaries, and facility
expenses would be regarded as fixed costs. Expense items such
as fuel, salaries of the crew piloting the plane, and disposable
amenities would be included as variable costs. If the variable
costs exceed the prices set for the route, then the government
has the potential to prove its case. The government would then
need to demonstrate that the airline stood a dangerous
probability of recovering any profits it lost after the new airline
has left the market.
A recent example is the case of United States v. AMR Corpora-
tion 4.3  AMR was a review by the Tenth Circuit of a motion for
summary judgment in which the District Court in Kansas dis-
missed a suit by the government against AMR Corp, the parent
company of American Airlines, for predatory pricing.35 The
government challenged the pricing strategies on various routes
in which American competed with smaller, low-cost carriers. 6
The government formulated four tests to show that American
Airlines was engaged in predatory pricing that relied upon
American's own internal accounting procedures which assigned
costs to each flight.37 Ultimately, the government lost its case on
the summary judgment motion because each of the four tests
included an allocation of fixed costs.3 8
The facts of the case indicate that American responded to the
entry of low-cost carriers into routes that it served by lowering
prices and increasing capacity on those routes in some mar-
3 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
35 United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001).
36 Id.
37 AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1116-17.
38 Id. at 1117-20.
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kets 9 Once the low-cost carrier either moved its operations or
ceased its operations, American resumed an earlier pricing strat-
egy, frequently raising prices and reducing capacity to pre-com-
petition levels.4 In addition, the government alleged that
American was intentionally establishing a reputation as a
predator that would vigorously defend its markets in an attempt
to monopolize other markets. 41 For example, before Vanguard
Airlines started competing with American Airlines for the DFW-
Wichita route, American charged an average fair of $99 to $108
on that route.42 When Vanguard entered the market, American
Airline's average fare fell and varied from $52 to $58 at the low
end to $61 to $75 at the high end.43 After Vanguard's exit from
the route, American's average fare increased to $88 to $102, and
then increased to $100 to $123. 44 On the surface, this would
appear to be cleverly disguised predatory pricing: American en-
joyed a monopoly price before the entry of a low cost carrier;
reduced prices until the low cost carrier, Vanguard in this case,
was forced to leave the market; and then raised prices, although
gradually, to a rate higher than when the competitor had en-
tered the market, apparently to recoup lost profits during the
period of time it was preying on the competition.
What the government apparently feared in the AMR case
could be described as multimarket recoupment.45 Multimarket
recoupment occurs when the alleged predatory pricer sets its
prices on its product below cost in some markets, and recoups
the loss from other markets while developing a reputation as a
predator that will aggressively defend all of its markets. 46 This
theory of recoupment has not yet been addressed by the Su-
preme Court,47 and therefore remains a possible means by
39 AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1145. The markets that were the subject of
the suit included DFW (Dallas-Fort Worth) and one other city, including such
cities as Kansas City, Wichita, Colorado Springs, Long Beach, Phoenix, Tampa,
and Oakland.
- Id. at 1144.
41 These markets included both small markets (such as Birmingham, Alabama;
Springfield, Missouri; and Omaha, Nebraska) and larger markets (such as Cleve-
land, Philadelphia, and San Francisco). Id. at 1145-46.
42 Id. at 1169.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1169-70.
45 Baker, supra note 1, 589-590.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 595-97 (noting that the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of
multimarket recoupment because the plaintiff's theory of the case dealt with one
market for cigarettes, not separate markets for generics and branded cigarettes).
844
2004] TO TRAP THE WHITE TIGER AND UNICORN
which an airline could engage in predatory pricing practices
and retain a dangerous probability of recouping its losses. This
is a real possibility for major airlines because their business is
split up amongst numerous markets and routes already. An air-
line that has a route with high capacity and high revenue could
use the profit from that route to offset losses it sustains while
attempting to drive out a competitor, likely a low-cost carrier,
from another route.
Assume, arguendo, that American did intend to attempt to
drive Valuejet out of markets in which the two airlines com-
peted, and that it hoped to discourage other airlines from com-
peting against them by setting an example. Current methods
for calculating predatory pricing behavior would permit them to
do this and allow them to get away with it. The airlines own
internal accounting procedures allocate fixed costs and margi-
nal costs to each flight, making it difficult to determine what the
marginal cost was for each flight. American uses this system to
make operating decisions for the airline.48 It seems illogical that
these methods are apparently reliable enough for American to
use in day-to-day operations, yet they are not adequate to allo-
cate price for a predatory pricing complaint. In effect, if Ameri-
can wanted to drive out a new low-cost carrier, they could lower
prices, increase capacity, wait for the competition to fold or
move out of the market, and then either increase their prices to
pre-competition levels or higher, or hope to recover the lost
profits from other markets. In the meantime, the public has
briefly enjoyed relatively low fares and additional alternatives in
air travel. However, once the low-cost carrier is driven from the
market, competition is harmed by the lack of alternatives and
the return to pre-competition, or higher, prices.
Although AMR may have been decided correctly under the
current antitrust law, and American Airlines may not have been
engaged in predatory pricing practices at all, the result offers
little hope or reassurance to fledgling low-cost carriers and new
airlines. Low-cost carriers lose their primary, if not their only
advantage, when their ability to make a profit at the expense of
low costs and few amenities is taken away. Instead of creating a
48 The two internal accounting systems used in the government's tests were
AAIMSPAN and FAUDNAC. Each accounting system took some measure of vari-
able and fixed costs in allocating total cost to a flight. Since each test used these
systems, and each system relied in part on fixed costs, the court ruled that they
were invalid for use in determing predatory pricing. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at
1116-17.
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more attractive product to the consumer, the major airline
needs to only drive out the competition through predatory pric-
ing. If they fear they might get caught, they just need to reallo-
cate their expenses so that they appear to be fixed instead of
variable, and the government will be unable to prove a case
against them. Existing predatory pricing and antitrust laws, as
demonstrated by this case, subject low-cost carriers to a preda-
tory practice that is not only lawful, but also does not allow them
to compete. To make matters worse, in some respects, this prac-
tice is subsidized by the government, as will be discussed later.
IV. LOW-COST CARRIERS
In order to understand some of the difficulties of current
predatory pricing law in the airline industry, it is necessary to
discuss exactly what a low-cost carrier is. A low-cost carrier "gen-
erally enjoy[s] the advantage of having lower costs than major
carriers,' 49 and may be characterized as an airline that operates
a "point-to-point network," and offers wages below the industry
standard which allow them to offer lower fares.5 ° Typically, low-
cost carriers can offer lower prices than the major airlines be-
cause they offer fewer amenities than larger airlines and their
overall costs are less than their larger competitors 1.5  As men-
tioned earlier, Southwest, like many other airlines, does not of-
fer reserved seating, but instead boards the majority of their
passengers in the order they arrived at the terminal.52 Other
low-cost carriers only operate on a limited number of routes,
and most do not offer in-flight meals. However, in recent years,
some low cost carriers have begun to experiment with adding
additional amenities, such as satellite TV, internet connec-
9 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting
that in 1994, the period immediately preceding the period of the alleged preda-
tory pricing, American had calculated Valuejet's, another low-cost carrier stage-
length adjusted cost per available seat mile to be 4.32 cents, and American's to be
8.54 cents).
50 Charles Najda, Low-Cost Carriers and Low Fares: Competition and Concen-
tration in the U.S. Airline Industry, (2003) (unpublished honors thesis, Stanford
University) (on file with the Stanford University Library).
51 Jon Bonn6, Making Sense of the Airline Business: Fewer frills and a focus on eco-
nomic fundamentals, Jan. 23, 2003, at www.msnbc.com/news/846211.asp.
52 Passengers are given a numbered boarding card as they arrive at the gate
and are boarded on the plane in groups of thirty, with those arriving last usually
getting the least "preferential" seats in the middle of the plane. Molly Ivins, From
Texas, With Love and Peanuts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999, available at http://www.
dke.org/kelleher.html.
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tions,53 and XM Satellite Radio54 in an attempt to attract addi-
tional customers.
Low-cost carriers hold two primary advantages over the larger
major airlines. As discussed earlier, the first advantage is that
they typically offer lower fares. These fares typically attract non-
business customers.55 Another advantage enjoyed by low-cost
carriers is that they usually offer more frequent flights. Low-cost
carriers are also typically easier to book flights with because the
fares for booking a last-minute flight on a low-cost carrier are
not as steep as the price increase on a last-minute ticket with one
of the major carriers. Another hallmark of the majority of low-
cost carriers is that they typically operate fewer gates at the ter-
minals they serve.56
Since their inception, low-cost carriers have enjoyed growing
popularity. Low-cost carriers "account for 25% of [airline] traf-
fic, up from 10% as recently as 1999." 57 The challenge at the
inception of low-cost carriers was to get customers to accept sec-
ond-rate air travel. As one commentator noted, the goal was to
"[s]ell cheaper airline tickets to passengers who wouldn't pay
for a full-fare, full-service ticket," with "one big caveat: It had to
be made clear to these passengers that they were getting a sec-
ond-class ride. 58 Low-cost carriers have grown so much in pop-
ularity that today, a low-cost carrier, Southwest Airlines, has
become the largest domestic airline.59
53 Banstetter, supra note 24 (stating that such amenities have "helped other
low-far carriers, particularly JetBlue Airways, draw passengers").
54 Id. (noting that AirTran Airways plans to add XM Satellite Radio).
55 Business travelers prefer the major airlines, and many have been forced to
use Southwest by their employers, who prefer lower fares over preferred arrival
times, in the face of economic cut-backs. Jennifer Frey, Southwest Airlines: It's More
ThanJust Peanuts, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2001, available at http://archives.california
aviation.org/airport/migl8937.html.
56 For example, low-cost carriers only accounted for 2.4% of the traffic at Dal-
las-Fort Worth International Airport in 2000 and used about that percentage of
gates. By comparison, American accounted for 70.2% of all traffic, and an even
higher percentage of gates. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1112.
57 Donna Rosato, Ready for Takeoff?; Recovering Airline Stocks Have Hit a Pocket of
Turbulence Again. In Other Words, it Looks Like a Buying Opportunity, MONEY, Feb. 1,
2004, available at 2004 WL 55037574.
58 Bonn6, supra note 51.
59 Banstetter, supra note 24 (stating that "Southwest Airlines remained the na-
tion's most profitable airline in 2003").
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V. AN EXAMPLE OF A LOW-COST CARRIER:
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES
Southwest Airlines is an example of a low-cost carrier based
out of Texas. Southwest Airlines was founded in Dallas and op-
erated out of Love Field offering service to Houston and San
Antonio in 1971.6° In recent years, Southwest has been one of a
handful of profitable airlines in the United States.6' In fact, it
has been the most profitable airline in the United States in the
last several years,6 2 and has posted profits for thirty-one consecu-
tive years.63 While other airlines were posting losses for 2003,
Southwest earned $442 million during the course of the year.6 4
Furthermore, while the major airlines were seeking government
bail-outs and laying off employees in the wake of the events of
September 11, 2001, Southwest continued its operations without
any change in personnel. In addition to remaining profitable,
Southwest routinely is rated the highest "in baggage handling
and on-time performance, with the fewest customer
complaints. 66
One reason it remains profitable is that it is able to keep its
Revenue Passenger Miles close to its Average Seat Miles. In an
internet article, Jon Bonn6 outlines how an airline like South-
west remains profitable, while other major airlines are not.6 7
Available Seat Miles (ASM) are defined as "the total of all the
seats available on every airline route, multiplied by the length of
the route. ' 6' Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) are the second
half of the equation. They are defined as "the number of seat-
miles for which the airline is actually filling a seat and making
money."69 The closer RPM is to ASM, the more of the airline's
60 Eric Torbenson, Southwest Thrives, but Love's on Wane. Dallas-based Carrier
Grows Despite Lack of Home-field Advantage, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 28, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 73118530.
61 Id.
62 Eric Torbenson, Airline Extends Profits, Southwest Meets Forecast to Chalk Up 31st
Year in the Black, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 23, 3004, available at 2004 WL
56660928.
63 Southwest Nails Another Year in the Black, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 23, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 57802710.
64 Torbenson, supra note 62. This represents an increase in profits over what
was earned in 2002, when Southwest earned $241 million.
65 Frey, supra note 55.
66 Ivins, supra note 52.
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capacity is being used, and the more revenue the airline enjoys.
This comparison is called revenue or yield, and shows how
much an airline will make on each mile it flies. 70 Southwest
made 11.67 cents per mile, while United, a major carrier, made
11.1.71 While this is not a major difference, it does help demon-
strate how Southwest is profitable while other major airlines are
not.
Bonn6 also points out that "a recent Southwest breakeven was
59.3 percent . . .while United's breakeven was a staggering
90.3."72 As a low-cost carrier that offers few amenities, Southwest
does not need to fill as many seats at a comparable price to that
of a major airline, such as United, in order to turn a profit. Al-
ternatively, Southwest can lower its fares on similar routes, fill
more seats, and still turn a profit. For the same period that
Southwest held a 59.3 percent breakeven point, their planes
were filled to 69.8 percent capacity. 73
In January of 2003, it was reported that the average cost to fly
a 1,000-mile route on a 737 was about $14,000 for a major car-
rier, which translates to about $120 for each paying passenger. 4
In the meantime, the cost to Southwest for the same flight was
about $10,000, or $102 per passenger.75 Bonn6 points out that
at that time, the Air Transport Association was reporting the av-
erage fare for a 1,000 mile route was $118.46.76 It can be easily
observed that any airline charging the average price was losing
money per customer at the rate of about $1.54. In the
meantime, a low-cost carrier, such as Southwest, is earning
about $16.46 per customer, if they charged that price.
In addition to keeping its RSM to ASM ratio close, Southwest
manages to keep its costs low in several other ways. As previ-
ously discussed, it does not offer many amenities, and has re-
sisted adding amenities to its flights. 77 There is no reserved
seating, 78 and Southwest does not provide in-flight meals.79 As








77 Banstetter, supra note 24 (noting that Southwest does not plan to add any
new amenities, such as satellite TV or internet connections, unlike other low cost
carriers such as JetBlue).
78 Ivins, supra note 52.
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nuts, but so are their fares. Southwest also saves money and
reduces cost through fuel hedging.80 Hedging is a practice used
to lock in prices, and in this case, Southwest "was 87 percent
hedged at oil prices equivalent to below $24 a barrel, well under
the spot price today of about $35."81 Furthermore, Southwest
maintains a "trademark 20-minute turnaround" for getting
planes ready for flights and out of the gates,82 which is half the
industry average. 83 Southwest's fleet is limited to Boeing 737 air-
craft, "which avoids the high costs of training pilots and mainte-
nance crews for a variety of aircraft."84 More recently, in order
to maintain low costs, Southwest has "eliminated commissions to
travel agencies, consolidated its ticketing operation by closing
three reservation centers and installed 'winglets' on a portion of
its fleet to make airplanes more fuel efficient. 85
Although Southwest enjoys a price advantage over many of its
major competitors, it does suffer from a few disadvantages. One
of these disadvantages is that Southwest Airlines' operations are
limited by the Wright Amendment86 at one of its major hubs.
The amendment was enacted by Congress in an attempt to cre-
ate a solution to a dispute between the two airports serving the
Dallas-Fort Worth area.87 Under this amendment, Southwest is
restricted as to which states it can fly to out of its Dallas hub.
Specifically, the amendment limits the ability of any airline to
establish a route that leaves from Love Field.88  Dallas-Fort
Worth International Airport is not affected. Currently, a passen-
ger flying out of Dallas on Southwest can only fly to other cities
79 Southwest does offer snack food, usually peanuts, but does not offer typical
airline meals. Frey, supra note 55.
80 Torbenson, supra note 62.
81 Id.
82 This practice has been maintained despite heightened security measures fol-
lowing September 11, 2001. Frey, supra note 55.
83 Ivins, supra note 52.
84 Tom Ramstack, 'Southwest Effect': Discount Airline Helps BWI Boost Numbers to
Pre-September 11 Level, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL 7720465.
85 Banstetter, supra note 24. The three reservation centers that closed were
located in Dallas, Salt Lake City, and Little Rock.
86 The Wright Amendment, International Air Transportation Competition Act
of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980).
87 The amendment was designed to protect the economic viability of DFW In-
ternational Airport and encourage airlines to not use Love Field. Kansas v.
United States, 16 F.3d 436, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
88 More specifically, the amendment limits the ability of commuter airlines car-
rying more than fifty-six passengers, and restricts charter flights to flying beyond
the states bordering Texas to ten per year. Id.
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in Texas, or to an airport in one of the surrounding states under
this amendment.8 9 Those passengers flying to destinations be-
yond the states bordering Texas may not check their baggage
for their entire trip and must recheck their baggage at each ter-
minal.9" There have been some unsuccessful legal challenges
made against the constitutionality of the amendment.91 In the
last several years, the Shelby Amendment was passed and has
increased the area to which planes leaving from Love Field can
fly non-stop to include Alabama, Mississippi, and Kansas.92
A few airlines have attempted to challenge the amendment by
establishing routes to cities and states outside of those permit-
ted, and some of those plans have been successful. Legend Air-
lines began offering service from Love Field to Los Angeles and
Washington, D.C. in April of 2000.93 The City of Fort Worth
and several airlines attempted to block Legend from offering
this service from Love Field.94 Eventually, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals ruled that the Wright Amendment and the Shelby
Amendment did not restrict commuter planes with less than
fifty-six passengers or a weight of less than 300,000 pounds.95
However, Legend Airlines folded and ceased to offer flights
from Love Field in December of 2000.96 In response to Leg-
end's service from Love Field, American Airlines offered service
to New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago; Continental Airlines of-
fered service to Cleveland; and Delta Air Lines offered service to
Atlanta from Love Field.97 After the September 11, 2001 terror-
ist attacks, American stopped all flights from Love Field and
Continental ceased its operations from Love Field to Cleve-
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 436 (affirming the denial of a challenge to the constitutionality of
the amendment for violating the port preference clause and the right to inter-
state travel or the First Amendment brought by airline travelers, the State of Kan-
sas, and a travel agency); see also Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1029 (5th Cir.
1991) (reversing a ruling dismissing a challenge to the constitutionality of the
amendment for violating the First Amendment, port preference clause, or the
right to interstate travel for lack of standing by an airline passenger).
92 Southwest's History at Love Field, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Aug. 28, 2003, availa-
ble at 2003 WL 73118525.
93 Id.
94 See Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 23 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
95 Id. at 97.
96 Southwest's History at Love Field, supra note 92.
97 Katie Fairbank, Delta to End Flights from Dallas Airport, DALLAs MORNING NEWS,
Mar. 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 17314871.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
land." Delta ceased its flights from Love Field to Atlanta as of
June 1, 2003, which effectively terminated all of its operations
from Love Field.99 Currently, Southwest and Continental are
the only airlines servicing Love Field, and Continental's service
is limited to regional service to Houston Intercontinental
Airport.100
The primary disadvantage of the Wright Amendment to any
potential customer in Dallas wishing to take advantage of South-
west's low fares, or any other airline operating out of Love Field
for that matter, is that the customer will have to make at least
one stop if they wish to travel anywhere beyond one of the states
authorized by the Wright and Shelby Amendments. A solution
to the inconvenience of customers having to change planes and
recheck baggage has been proposed. "Through-ticketing" is a
concept by which a customer would be able to buy a single ticket
for destinations that would require at least one stop after leaving
Love Field. 1°1 The customers would still have to change planes,
but they would be saved the inconvenience of buying more than
one ticket, and this feature is projected to increase traffic for
Southwest Airlines and Love Field. 0 2 However, Southwest does
not intend to pursue this option or make any challenges to the
Wright Amendment in general. 1°0 The role of the limitations
imposed by the Wright Amendment upon Southwest in current
predatory pricing schemes will be discussed below.
This description of Southwest Airlines was only to provide an
example of a low-cost carrier. Southwest is arguably the most
successful low-cost carrier of all time, making it a model for low-
cost carriers entering the market, 10 4 and perhaps for established
airlines in the market today. Given its position as the largest
domestic carrier, 05 Southwest is an unlikely target for a success-
ful predatory pricing scheme. However, a new airline just enter-
ing the market that does not have the benefit of thirty-one




100 Southwest's History at Love Field, supra note 92.
101 Torbenson, supra note 60.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See Frey, supra note 55 (quoting David Stempler, president of the Air Trav-
elers Association, "They have a very successful business model ... they know what
works and they don't change it based on changing circumstances.").
105 Banstetter, supra note 24.
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VI. PROBLEMS IN MEASURING COST
There are several obstacles to accurately measuring costs.
The first obstacle is the one most frequently cited by courts: it is
difficult to measure and isolate variable costs from fixed costs.
As illustrated in the discussion of the AMR case,1"6 it may be
impossible for the firm, or airline, accused of predatory pricing
to separate fixed costs from marginal costs. Therefore, even if a
firm is engaged in predatory pricing, it may be impossible to
prove. Outside of the difficulty of measuring or determining
variable costs, several factors exist which either disguise cost, in-
fluence pricing legally, or change price in package discounts
that have been found to be legal by the courts.
A. DECREASING PROFITS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
A fairly serious problem is that the airlines overall have suf-
fered decreasing profits in recent years. After the terrorist at-
tacks of September 11, 2001, the airlines overall have suffered
decreasing fares and declining profits. 10 7 Costs have not de-
clined at a rate below that of revenues.108 In addition, there are
not as many passengers paying full airfare. 0 9 Therefore, reve-
nue for the airlines is reduced. Ultimately, this should not mat-
ter in an investigation for predatory pricing because the
government should be looking for prices set below costs, not
revenues that exceed expenses. In addition, the government
would most likely be looking for reductions in prices that occur
after a new airline has entered the market. However, at some
point the airlines must retrieve some of their costs. A couple of
immediate solutions present themselves. First, airlines can re-
duce capacity. This would reduce cost, but it would only reduce
variable costs for the flights or routes eliminated. The fixed
costs would remain because, as stated earlier, fixed costs remain
the same despite any changes in capacity.
Another solution to this problem is to reduce prices in an at-
tempt to attract the public back to the airlines. If prices were set
]o6 See supra Part III.
107 See generally Gilbertson, supra note 33. See also Banstetter, supra note 24
(nothing that business fares for Southwest were beginning to rebound in the
fourth quarter of 2003 after having fallen dramatically for three years).
108 Airline revenues per seat mile were falling before September 11 at the rate
of 4.5% annually while costs were only decreasing at a rate of 0.7% annually.
Paul Craig Roberts, Did Airline Regulation Fail?, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, avail-
able at 2003 WL 7718855.
109 Gilbertson, supra note 33.
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below cost, this would automatically give the government one
element of a predatory pricing claim. Of course the difference
here is that the airline is not attempting to harm competition.
In fact, it might be argued that by trying to save themselves, the
airline is protecting competition. If an airline fails, then there is
one less provider in the market, and competition ultimately suf-
fers. Without competition, an airline is able to maintain mo-
nopoly prices. Even though the airline stands a chance of
recovering lost profits in the future when and if the public's
confidence in air safety returns, there is not a high probability,
nor is it dangerously likely; 10 therefore, the second element of a
predatory pricing claim would be difficult if not impossible to
prove. If by some chance that could be proved, the government
would still have to prove there was some sort of intent to harm
competition, which was not the motivation for reducing prices
in the first place.
An additional solution to declining revenues in the airline in-
dustry would be to invest in additional safety measures."' The
goal of investing in additional safety measures would be to re-
store consumer confidence in the airline industry by ensuing
that they would be safe when traveling. The drawback to this
solution is that additional costs would be incurred."a 2 Airlines
would most likely be unable to increase prices in relation to
these costs if they actually wanted to attract customers back to
the airlines. As with a reduction in prices, the goal is not to
harm competition, but to preserve revenue, and should defeat
any claim of predatory pricing.
B. SHORT-TERM DISCOUNTS
Beyond declining profits and post-September 11 factors, an-
other problem in measuring costs accurately is legitimate short-
term discounts. There is nothing wrong with a short-term dis-
count designed to attract business, or to fill more seats during
110 See Susan Donnelly, Air Support, Should the U.S. Keep Bailing Out Airlines?
Here's a Post-9/11 Success Story-Plus a Cautionary Tale, TIME, Dec. 1, 2003, available
at 2003 WL 66980394. The loss of business for the airlines was so sever that Con-
gress provided $15 billion in subsidies and loans to the airlines within one month
of September 11, 2001.
111 Additional safety measures have been mandated and authorized for the air-
lines since September 11. The cost has been exorbitant for some airlines, caus-
ing some airlines to request bailouts from Congress. Id.
112 Providing bailouts to airlines in order to reduce the impact of the costs for
new safety measures has been a potential solution discussed by the government.
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off-peak seasons. Remember, the goal is to have RPM and ASM
as close as possible in order to increase revenues. 13 However,
this raises a question as to whom or what defines a short-term
discount. Usually, reasonableness will make clear what is and
what is not a short-term discount. A discount offered for two
weeks during off-peak seasons would in most cases be reasona-
ble, while a "discount" that lasts two years is an established fare.
C. INTERNET AIR RESERVATION SERVICES
An additional problem is presented in organizations such as
Orbitz. This company is representative of a growing trend of
internet businesses that have established themselves as discount
providers of airfare, hotel rooms, and other travel expenses.114
In the United States, "[i]nternet sales represent about 15% of
airline tickets sold.""' 5 Low-cost carriers, including Southwest,
Jet Blue, Air Tran, and ATA, have not participated in the Orbitz
internet venture.' 1 6 Typically, these organizations are able to of-
fer discounted rates because they purchase blocks of airfare
from the airlines at a discount. In Brooke, the Supreme Court
ruled that similar discounts offered in the cigarette industry
were not in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. 1 7 The differ-
ence between discounts offered by an organization such as
Orbitz and the discounts that were offered to retailers in the
Brooke case is that Orbitz is owned by the airlines."' Orbitz has
been challenged by various travel agencies, airlines, and the gov-
ernment 1 9 for various antitrust violations in stifling competi-
113 Bonn6, supra note 51.
114 Other such providers include Travelocity, Priceline.com, Expedia.com and
Hotels.com.
115 Orbitz Antitrust Inquiry Dropped, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, available at
2003 WL 2424508.
116 Id.
117 509 U.S. at 209 (1993).
118 The "About Orbitz" section of the company's website states "How it All
Started: Five airlines - American, Continental, Delta, Northwest and United -
came together to fulfill a mission: Develop a website that would serve people
better. Orbitz was designed for you - to make your travel planning experience
easier and more affordable." Orbitz about Orbitz, at http://www.orbitz.com/
App/about/about.jsp?c=3zsd&r= 3 g; see also, Orbitz Antitrust Inquiry Dropped, supra
note 115.
119 The Justice Department closed its antitrust investigation of the Orbitz on-
line service after finding no evidence that the company stifled competition.
Orbitz Antitrust Inquiry Dropped, supra note 115.
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tion, 12 ° denial of agent commissions,121 and for providing false
and misleading information. 122
D. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF PREDATORY PRICING
A distinct problem exists when these types of cases reach the
courtroom. A court attempting to determine what the current
rule of law is in an antitrust case is faced with a dizzying array of
precedents. The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its
handling of antitrust cases over the past century. 123 In over 100
cases heard, originating from all over the country and interpret-
ing antitrust laws in various ways, the Supreme Court has only
overruled two cases. 124 Not only does the government have to
determine that the alleged predatory pricer has set price below
cost, but they must convince the presiding judge that the case
law that supports their position is the correct interpretation of
statutory law from at least four schools of precedent in antitrust
law.125 The government or other plaintiff has at least the oppos-
ing attorney and their expert, if not the judge's prior experi-
ence, working against them.
VII. PROBLEM WITH RECOUPING LOST PROFITS
Measuring cost is not the only problem inherent in current
predatory pricing law. In addition to measuring cost, the gov-
ernment must prove that the alleged predatory pricer had a
dangerous probability, or a likely probability, depending on
which act the predatory pricing claim was pursued under, of re-
120 See Class Action Sought in Orbitz Suit, Nov. 4, 2002, at www.siliconvalley.com/
mld/siliconvalley/4442492.htm? (noting that travel agencies sued Orbitz and
three of the airlines that own the site and sought lost commissions and the disso-
lution of Orbitz).
121 Forty travel agencies filed a lawsuit against Orbitz and its owner airlines,
marking the third such lawsuit in three years. This suit alleged a conspiracy to
cut and eliminate commissions and sought compensation for lost commissions.
Tricia A. Holly, Agent Lawsuits Mount Against Airlines Over Alleged Antitrust Viola-
tions, TRAVEL AGENT, May 26, 2003, available at 2003 WL 11294163.
122 Southwest Airlines brought suit against Orbitz for providing "false and mis-
leading" information regarding its fares and travel schedule, improper use of its
trademark, and contests Orbitz's claim that they guarantee the lowest available
airfares. Michael Mahoney, Orbitz Sued by Southwest Airlines, E-COMMERCE TIMES,
May 4, 2001, available at www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/9518.html.
123 Pierce, supra note 6.
124 Id.; see, State Oil v. Khan, 552 U.S. 3, 22 (1997); Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
125 Pierce, supra note 6, at 1112; THOMAS MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS (2d ed. 2001).
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couping lost profits. 126 In effect, this only punishes a firm en-
gaging in predatory pricing if it profits from such activity. This
element is not consistent with the goal of antitrust law. That
goal is to protect competition, and ultimately, the consumer.
To illustrate this point, we can adopt the facts of the AMR
case. Recall how American lowered its rates on flights from
DFW airport to Wichita in relation to Vanguard offering service
on that route, and subsequently raised its rates after Vanguard
left. 127 Assume that American was never able to recover the lost
profits and other losses it incurred. 128  Has competition been
hurt any less because American did not recover its lost profits?
The answer is undoubtedly "no." While there were two airlines
serving the route, customers had two airlines to choose from,
and the airlines had an incentive to keep prices low. With the
loss of Vanguard, American no longer has an incentive to offer
more flights at a lower price because the competition is gone.
VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There are a wide variety of solutions to the problems sur-
rounding predatory pricing claims. Some of the solutions do
not require predatory pricing law to change its elements at all.
Other solutions are focused on amending, eliminating, or
changing the elements of successful predatory pricing claims.
A. GOVERNMENT ACTION
There are two possible solutions to predatory pricing in the
airline industry that require no modification to existing preda-
tory pricing law. The first of these solutions is concerned with
economic assistance provided to the airlines. In the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the major airlines
applied for and received $15 billion in bailouts from Con-
gress. 1 29 In the meantime, Southwest Airlines did not receive
126 Id.
127 See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1112-13 (10th Cir. 2003);
United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1157-61 (D. Kans. 2001) (con-
cerning the change in rates with regards to Vanguard).
128 American Airlines has posted losses over the last two years. In 2002, it
posted a total loss for the year of $3.5 billion. In 2003, American posted losses of
$1.3 billion. Continental, WestJet Post Profits in 2003, AiRLINE FINANCLAL NEWS, Jan.
26, 2004, available at 2004 WL 61714575. Some industry experts believe Ameri-
can Airlines will post a profit in 2004. Profit Outlook for American Improves Dramati-
cally, AiRLINE FINANCIAL NEWS, Feb. 2, 2004, available at 2004 WL 61714581.
129 Donnelly, supra note 110.
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bailouts, and still managed to post a profit, albeit a smaller
profit than usual. 3 ° While America West used the assistance it
received to reinvent itself as a profitable low-cost carrier, other
airlines, such as US Airways, have squandered their assistance
and remain inefficient.13 1 When the government provides these
bailouts, it permits the airline receiving them to carry on with
business as usual. An unprofitable airline that has priced its
fares below cost can continue to do so because the shortfall will
be subsidized by the government. However, simply denying air-
lines government assistance is not as easy of a solution as it
sounds. United Airlines has continued to post losses since re-
ceiving its last bailout and is expected to ask the government for
an additional $1.8 billion in aid.1 3 2 While it might be tempting
to deny United Airlines the aid, there are 62,174 jobs on the
line. 13 3 Failing to provide some sort of assistance could have po-
litical and economic repercussions.1 34 In addition, the United
States traveling public has become increasingly reliant on air
travel.1 35 Allowing an airline to fail is likely to cause severe dis-
ruption to travel and the economy. The argument for not pro-
viding bailouts would be that it would force airlines to control
their costs, set prices effectively, or go out of business and allow
another established airline to fill the void.136 In fact, some ex-
perts predict that consolidation inside the airline industry is
inevitable. 37
The second solution is more specific to the Dallas-Fort Worth
area, and Texas in general. This solution calls for the repeal of
130 Ramstack, supra note 84.
131 America West received $380 million in assistance from the government and
has transformed itself into an industry leader. In the meantime, it is suspected
that US Airways will file for bankruptcy if they do not receive additional govern-





135 Through September of 2003, the domestic carriers combined for a total of
439,842,373 passengers. http://www.twa-employees-at-aa.com/employees~pas-
sengers.htm.
136 Donnelly, supra note 110 (quoting the head of Delta Airlines that the Air
Transportation Stabilization Board, which is in charge of the bail outs, should
quit providing assistance to the airlines, and "[1]et the marketplace work").
137 Roberts, supra note 108. Roberts also points out that consolidation would
eventually lead to only two, and in many cases, one, airline serving most routes,
which would lead to monopoly prices and re-regulation along with the problems
inherent therein.
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the Wright Amendment. The Wright Amendment, as discussed
earlier, prevents Southwest from competing with American,
which is the dominant carrier operating out of DFW,18 on
routes that extend beyond the surrounding states. Without this
competition, American has been able to sustain high fares." 9 If
Southwest were not shackled by the Wright Amendment and
permitted to offer service out of Dallas to cities such as Wichita,
American would be forced to price its airfares at reasonable
levels. This has been referred to as the "Southwest effect:" when
the airline moves into a market, the other airlines are forced to
lower their fares to compete.140 If the Wright Amendment had
been repealed then the AMR case likely never would have oc-
curred. 4 a American would not have been able to reduce prices
in response to a new competitor because they would have al-
ready been forced to price their fares reasonably in comparison
to Southwest's. It is the absence of competition that encourages
airlines like Vanguard to attempt to enter the Dallas-Fort Worth
market.42 While Southwest may have grown past the point
where it is vulnerable to predatory pricing attacks, new low-cost
carriers are vulnerable to such tactics. On the surface, this does
not to appear to benefit competition because it denies an addi-
tional participant to the market. However, competition would
be benefited because there would be two major airlines keeping
prices in check.
B. ALTERING THE ELEMENTS OF PREDATORY PRICING
If predatory pricing as a cause of action is to survive, then the
manner in which it is determined must change. As stated ear-
lier, the goal of predatory pricing laws and regulations, as with
all antitrust law, is to protect competition. That goal is nearly
impossible under current economic standards of measuring
predatory pricing. Much of predatory pricing litigation has
138 See AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1112 (finding that in 2000, American's share of
passengers at DFW was 70.2%).
139 Currently, rates on airfare out of DFW are some of the highest in the coun-
try. See generally Washington Irving, The Wrong Amendment Strikes Again, PLANE
PERSPECTIWES, June 11, 1999, available at http://www.planebusiness.com/perspec-
tives/p061199irving.html.
140 Ramstack, supra note 84. Recently this effect was felt at the Baltimore-Wash-
ington International Airport after Southwest Airlines began operations there in
2002, and increased traffic at the airport from approximately nine million passen-
gers in the 1993 to nineteen million passengers in 2002.
141 Irving, supra note 139.
142 Id.
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been molded by the "Chicago school of economics," and more
recently influenced and reshaped by the "post-Chicago
school." 4 ' The Chicago school largely believes that predatory
pricing is impossible, 44 while the post-Chicago school believes
that predatory pricing can exist under the right
circumstances. 145
Some scholars have proposed moving beyond Chicago school
economics completely and embracing post-Chicago economic
models to determine antitrust violations. 14 6 Those attempts
have been criticized as being inconsistent and unpersuasive. 147
In addition, inappropriate education of the judge and jury in
post-Chicago theories, biased experts in the trial setting, and the
confusion caused by lawyers questioning those experts have
been cited as reasons why post-Chicago theories are not yet
ready for the court room. 4 Another problem with relying on
post-Chicago models is that if utilized correctly, motive is irrele-
vant.149 Rather than relying solely on economic models, per-
haps it is time to amend current tests for predatory pricing, or to
establish whole new methods of determining predatory pricing.
There are several possible solutions to the problem of measur-
ing predatory pricing. These solutions are based on current ec-
onomic models, including Chicago and post-Chicago versions,
for determining liability. These solutions include shifting the
focus of a predatory pricing inquiry to intent and results, al-
143 The "Chicago school of economics" is a body of scholarly literature pro-
duced by economists either educated at the University of Chicago, or by profes-
sors that taught there. These scholars created economic models that attempted
to demonstrate how acts that the government described as predatory could never
harm competition. The "post-Chicago school" is comprised of scholars that have
created economic models that attempt to demonstrate how predatory pricing
could exist under the right circumstances, such as multimarket recoupment.
Pierce, supra note 6, at 1105-06 (noting that the judge ruled for the government
after inconsistent evidence was given using the post-Chicago models).
14 Id. at 1103.
145 Id. at 1105-06.
146 Such an attempt was made in a series of cases against Microsoft. See United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999); see also Pierce, supra note 6, at 1103.
147 Pierce, supra note 6, at 1103.
148 Id. at 1109-10.
149 Id. at 1114. Pierce argues that motive should not be considered because of
the unreliability of evidence (such as internal memos that rely on war-like lan-
guage), and that motive to harm a competitor while helping oneself is healthy for
competition. Id. at 1113. However, this would make predatory pricing a strict
liability offense, which it is not meant to be.
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lowing the prosecution to use the airline's method of account-
ing to determine cost, or to use an industry standard to
determine cost.
1. Shifting Focus of Predatory Pricing to Intent and Results
One possible solution to the problems created by the current
method of measuring predatory pricing would be to simplify
what determines predatory pricing. This method could be de-
scribed as more focused on intent and results. Instead of mak-
ing the formula prices below cost plus the dangerous probability
of recapturing lost profits by increasing prices at a later date
after the competitor has been forced from the market, a test
that alters the measure of cost could be employed. Instead of
looking for prices set below cost, the court could look for prices
set at cost orjust above cost. This by itself would not be enough.
The government would also need to prove that prices were set at
this level in order to harm not just a competitor, but competi-
tion overall. Any measure of likelihood of recovery of lost prof-
its at a later time is unnecessary. This test would give more focus
to intent, action, and result. In order to prove a predatory pric-
ing claim under this test, the government or plaintiff would
need to demonstrate prices were set below, at, or near cost, a
predatory intent, and that competition was harmed. A strict
measure of cost is not as important, and if necessary, could be-
come an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of the case.
Predatory intent could be proven through extrinsic evidence,
such as internal memos or statements by the officers of the
airline. 150
An example of such a test from outside the airline industry
can be found in Transamerica Computer Company v. IBM."' In
this case, the Ninth Circuit held that prices could not be consid-
ered per se legal if the prices exceeded the marginal cost of the
alleged predatory pricer. 5 2 The court recognized that presum-
ing costs that were over price to be presumptively legal fore-
closed the consideration of other factors such as intent, market
power, and long-run behavior.1"
150 Id. at 1115.
151 Transamerica Comp. Co., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
152 Id. at 1386.
153 Id. at 1387. This result is also supported by "post-Chicago" economics,
which suggests that a firm that sets its price just above cost can deter aggressive
competition and harm competition. Baker, supra note 1, at 591.
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If this test were applied in the AMR case, it is likely that the
government would have survived the summary judgment mo-
tion, and had an opportunity to present their case to the jury.
At that point, the government would have had a far more man-
ageable task of demonstrating to the jury how American Airlines
reduced its fares and increased capacity on those routes in
which they were threatened by a low-cost carrier, and then re-
sumed prices from the pre-predatory pricing era once the com-
petitor was forced from the market. This is not to say that
American would have been found liable for predatory pricing,
but it would at least have made them explain the rationale be-
hind drastically lowering their prices to apparently unprofitable
levels in the face of competition from a low-cost carrier, and
then raising those prices once the competition left.
2. Acceptance of the Airline's Internal Measure of Cost
An alternative solution would be to allow the government or a
plaintiff to use the airline's own accounting procedures against
them. If it is good enough for the boardroom, it should be
good enough for the courtroom. Stated differently, if an airline
can rely on an accounting system that allocates portions of fixed
costs to a route in order to make operating decisions based on
that route, then why should the government not be allowed to
use the same information to prosecute that airline for predatory
pricing? The traditional answer is that this information includes
fixed costs, which do not change regardless of the addition or
subtraction of routes and flights. This argument misses a key
point by completely ignoring intent.
If an airline deems it important to allocate some fixed costs to
a new route, or the addition of a flight to that route, who is the
court to say that this information is not important in making this
operating decision? How an airline runs its business, as long as
it is done legally, is up to the managers and executives of the
airline. If it is important to the airline that fixed costs be repre-
sented in their calculations when determining whether to add
or subtract a flight or route, then the court should accept this
method of accounting.
There are several advantages to using this type of test. First, it
alleviates the need of the government, or plaintiff, and the de-
fendant of attempting to measure cost, because it will have al-
ready been done by the defendant. Every publicly traded
company is required to report to the Security Exchange Com-
mission on a quarterly basis. Therefore, they should have an
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accurate record of costs nearly four times per year. Second, this
encourages airlines to keep better records, and to employ more
accurate accounting procedures. This not only benefits the gov-
ernment in the area of predatory pricing, it allows better moni-
toring for violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act"' and permits
the investing public to make more informed decisions on their
investments. Third, it encourages the more efficient use of
resources.
Once the method of accounting is accepted by the court, the
burden of the government is lessened. One of the three ele-
ments of a predatory pricing allegation is easy to determine:
price set below cost. Neither the government nor the defendant
is required to determine what average variable cost or marginal
cost is for the airline, or the industry in question. There are no
disputes as to what should be classified as a fixed cost and what
is properly classified as a variable cost. The time it takes to bring
a predatory pricing claim to trial will have been reduced dramat-
ically.155 The most difficult hurdle in successfully prosecuting a
claim of predatory pricing 156 has been overcome.
If this type of test had been used in AMR, the government
would have survived the summary judgment motion. The gov-
ernment had prepared four different tests to measure cost using
American's own accounting systems. 57 In addition, American
admittedly "overrode its own internal capacity-planning models
for [pricing for each contested] route, which had previously in-
dicated that such increases would be unprofitable. 1 158 As men-
tioned earlier, each test was rejected because each included
some measure of fixed costs, which lead to the motion for sum-
mary judgment being granted. 159 Under this method, Ameri-
can's admission of pricing its fares at a level they knew to be
unprofitable would have been enough to survive the summary
154 15 U.S.C. § 7215 (2003).
155 Many predatory pricing claims never reach the trial stage because of the
time needed to successfully determine what the costs of the alleged infringer are.
Pierce, supra note 6, at 1110-11 (noting that an antitrust case against IBM that was
started in 1969 was eventually dismissed thirteen years later, years short of a reso-
lution, after IBM was no longer a dominant player in the computer market, and
noting that a similar, current case against Microsoft was three years old at no
closer to a resolution).
156 See Transamerica Computer Co., 698 F.2d at 1377; United States v. AMR Corp.,
335 F.3d 1109, 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
157 AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1116-19.
158 Id. at 1112.
159 Id. at 1121.
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judgment motion, and the government could have presented its
case to a jury that would determine whether the prices com-
plained of were in fact low enough to be predatory.
3. An Industry Standard for Measure of Cost (or Southwest Airlines
as a measure of cost)
A third solution would be to adopt an industry standard for
cost. The disadvantage of this method is that it puts the burden
on the defense to justify why their prices fall below cost. Intui-
tively, the burden should fall on the government or the plaintiff
in showing that there is a cause of action. However, the goal is
to simply allow the government to make a prima facie case. If
the defendant company is not engaging in predatory pricing, it
could always move for summary judgment and submit an affida-
vit outlining its actual cost, and demonstrate how their prices
are actually set above cost. The burden would then shift back to
the government/plaintiff to prove either that the figures submit-
ted by the defendant were inaccurate, or that there was still an
intent to lower prices to drive out the competition.
Another potential disadvantage of this method would be de-
termining who gets to set the industry standard. One possible
solution to this problem would be to use the cost information of
an existing airline. Southwest Airlines comes to mind because
of its history of profitability and low prices. The disadvantage of
using this method is that a low-cost carrier is going to have a
different set of costs than one of the other major airlines. 160
Southwest does not offer reserved seating, in flight meals, or
first class. An airline like American or United offers all these
amenities plus some others. All three items would change the
cost for the airline. If Southwest were used as a measure of cost
in the AM case, then American, and any other airline the gov-
ernment decided to allege predatory pricing against, would have
had a large burden of showing why their costs were set as high as
they were. Furthermore, Southwest may not be inclined to
share all of its corporate secrets for success with its competition.
160 Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.
1984) (stating that requiring a "[firm's] bids be above competitors' costs would
deprive [that firm] (and others similarly situated) of reward from greater effi-
ciency. This would serve only to stifle the incentive to compete").
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4. A Standard of Cost Set by an Independent Party
A preferable solution would be to allow an independent third
party to establish these standard costs. Of course, on the sur-
face, the disadvantage of this method would be the need to es-
tablish an agency to keep track of these types of costs. Ideally,
existing cost information could be used to determine these
types of costs. IfJon Bonn6 can create a four page article that is
indicative of what an airline's general costs are,'61 then it should
not be too difficult to adopt a standard index.
The other advantage of this solution is that by establishing a
standard index of costs for the airline industry, it can be better
policed. The government only need compare listed prices for
any airline against the index to be able to determine if there is
some sort of an antitrust violation. On the flip side, an airline
would know in advance when they are likely looking at litigation
for a potential predatory pricing violation. Armed with this in-
formation, the airline could be prepared to demonstrate how its
costs differ from the index, and why its prices are in line with its
costs. This would allow both the government and the airlines to
avoid costly litigation.
One of the greatest advantages to all of these methods is that
airlines would no longer be able to hide behind their own sus-
pect accounting procedures. Under current predatory pricing
law, a major airline can weed out smaller competitors using
predatory pricing practices and get away with it. The require-
ment of a demonstration of prices below cost allows them to do
so. As discussed earlier, AMR demonstrates a possible scenario.
For the sake of discussion, assume that American was trying to
force out its competition. It already had a huge advantage in
resources, an example of which is its established fleet. Increas-
ing capacity on a route for them is simply a matter of moving a
few more flights to that route. A smaller, low-cost carrier does
not have that luxury. American can overwhelm a smaller com-
petitor by adding flights to a contested route, reducing prices on
that route below their actual costs, and then wait for the com-
petitor to either abandon the route or go out of business. Due
to its size, American could attempt to engage in multimarket
recoupment, and should theoretically be able to absorb the
losses on the route until the competitor leaves, at which point it
can reduce capacity and increase prices in an attempt to recover
16] Bonn6, supra note 51.
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lost profits. If the competitor or the government complains, it is
up to them to prove that American's prices were in fact below
cost. As AMR demonstrates, that is nearly impossible to do, so
American, or another large airline, would get away with it.
IX. CONCLUSION
Predatory pricing has evolved over the course of the past cen-
tury through the influence of economic models. As defined,
predatory pricing is akin to the mythical unicorn: no firm, or
airline, would engage in such behavior because of the extreme
unlikelihood of recovering lost profits after the competition has
been forced from the market. Furthermore, even if a rare case
of predatory pricing did exist as defined under current law, the
government, or other plaintiff, would have an extremely diffi-
cult time in capturing this white tiger because of the impossible
standards set by the courts. Therefore, it is time for Congress to
step in and arm the government with better traps, and it is time
for the Supreme Court to stop paying attention to the conflict-
ing economic models of the Chicago and post-Chicago schools.
If the elements of predatory pricing are not going to be
changed, then the government can help prevent predatory pric-
ing by refusing to subsidize and grant bailouts to airlines that do
not show a record of profitability and by repealing laws, such as
the Wright Amendment, that prevent competition instead of en-
couraging it. This can be accomplished by relaxing or altering
the standards for measuring cost and placing more focus on in-
tent to harm competition and the resulting harm to competi-
tion. While the airline industry is essential to the nation's
economy, it is time for the government to stop subsidizing pred-
atory behavior and allow the airline industry to establish more
realistic models of operation.
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